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Abstract 
This article contests the suggestion that the automation of production and the provision 
of a basic income potentiate the transition from a post-work to a postcapitalist society. 
This vista -mainly represented by the work of Paul Mason and Nick Srnicek and Alex 
Williams misses how capitalist work is both preconditioned by a historically-specific set of 
antagonistic social relations of constrained social reproduction, and, determined by the 
specific social forms its results assume in commodity exchange and the constituted form 
of the nation-state. We argue that the transitional demands of automation and a basic 
income may serve to stem postcapitalist transformation, stopping short at a post-work 
society characterized by the continuation of capitalist social relations and forms. Retaining 
money under the rule of the nation-state, the proposed transition between post-work and 
postcapitalist society breaks insufficiently with the present, in some ways making it worse 
by replacing a wage over which workers can lawfully bargain with a state-administered 
monetary payment that creates a direct relationship of power between citizen and state, 
liquidating labor struggles. We show how the Unemployed Workers Organizations in 
Argentina offer a ‘concrete utopian’ alternative that creates the capacity to reshape the 
relationship between individuals, society and the rule of money, value and the capitalist 
state rather than reinforce it. 
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Introduction 
Today, the post-work society has become a hot topic of debate, taking hold in the 
unlikeliest of quarters including UK Labor Party policy seminars and the World Economic 
Forum in Davos. This has unfolded in a historical context of the crisis of the relationship 
between employment and broader social reproduction. In this paper, we expose and 
critique the nascent 'post-work' political imaginary and its claim that 
a postcapitalist society can be aided into existence by the implementation of transitional 
policies centered on automation, a universal basic income (UBI) and, somewhat less 
problematically, the reduction of working hours. In making this claim, we suggest, many 
accounts of the post-work prospectus run the risk of reifying work as something apart 
from the social relations of subsistence and social reproduction in which it is imbricated. 
This then allows the proposal of a UBI, which relies on money as a neutral unit of 
exchange and account rather than something that itself carries these antagonistic 
relations of production and consumption. Hence, rather than heralding a ‘utopian’ vision 
(van Parijs, 2013), we instead find attending the UBI an abstract ‘bad utopia’ that only 
insufficiently breaks with the present. 
We focus on the most sophisticated and extended expositions of this thesis, which 
tend not to state in simple terms that the escape from work is synonymous with or a 
catalyst of the escape from capitalism. But the bold, attention grabbing titles they appear 
under do tend to play upon the association of the two that characterizes much of the way 
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they have been received in the public sphere; for instance, Inventing the Future: 
Postcapitalism and a World Without Work (Srnicek and Williams 2015). The latter authors 
reject what they misleadingly call ‘folk politics’ and propose, instead, that the left should 
demand four things: full automation, the reduction of the working week, the provision of a 
basic income and the diminishment of the work ethic (p.127). Whilst they forewarn that 
these demands that emblazon the cover of their book ‘will not break us out of capitalism’, 
only ‘neoliberalism’, they do suggest that their implementation could ‘establish a new 
equilibrium of political, economic and social forces’ that would create ‘even more potential 
to launch to greater goals’ (2015, p. 108). This suggests that Srnicek and Williams’s post-
work position could be critiqued only insofar as the critique centers on these goals ‘and 
not the horizon of post-capitalism’ (Stronge 2017). As such here we focus on how these 
transitional demands, shared in common with other post-work thinkers, relate to the end 
goal of a postcapitalist society, rather than imputing to them any directly postcapitalist 
content of their own.  
Postcapitalism, in the work of Paul Mason (2015a) for instance, hinges on a 
transitional period running out of the present and into the future. But this, we argue, will 
not come through the suite of options presently on offer which purport to escape work 
alone- principally, automation and the UBI- and not the social relations and social forms 
that characterize capitalist society, among them value, commodities and money. From 
the theoretical perspective advanced here, work as such is not the central social 
relationship that defines capitalism, and any attempt to define a postcapitalist society 
based on a set of transitional political prescriptions that address only work and stop short 
of addressing all the other relationships of capitalist society will obstruct rather than 
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facilitate the development of an alternative to the latter. We focus instead on how work 
itself is undergirded at one end in a set of antagonistic social relations of separation from 
and dispossession of the means of production and the reproduction of labor-power, and, 
at the other end, in the form its results assume as value-bearing commodities exchanged 
in the market by means of money.  
Theoretically, we combine in this paper two radically revisionist schools of 
contemporary Marxism. First is the social reproduction approach. Social reproduction is 
‘a broad term for the domain where lives are sustained and reproduced’ (Zechner and 
Hansen, 2015). This suggests that capitalism is characterized as much by what supports 
a society of work as work itself, and that the work relationship is not the only relationship 
that needs to be undone for capitalism to be abolished. It is labor power and its 
reproduction by a range of actors and activities that counts, rather than labor and its 
performance by workers alone. A social reproduction approach is also advocated by 
Marxist feminists. Tithi Bhattacharya (2018) contends that the separation between 
production and social reproduction has been historically created. Bhattacharya begins 
from Marx’s understanding of the valorization of capital as comprising ‘moment[s] of a 
totality’ such that ‘each social process of production is at the same time a process of 
reproduction’ (Marx, 1976, p. 711). This approach allows us to move on from a 
productivist Marxism without abandoning Marx, thereby making a multiplicity of forms of 
oppression apparent beyond the traditional class relation. Thus, production and social 
reproduction do not take place in the economic and the social spheres respectively, but 
are both fields of labor conflict and struggle (Bhattacharya, 2018). The crisis of social 
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reproduction is simultaneously a crisis of the separation of production and social 
reproduction.  
We complement this social reproduction understanding of the social relations that 
characterize capitalist society with Marxian value-form theory in order to comprehend the 
'social forms' that render capitalism an historically specific social formation (Pitts 
2017). This suggests capitalism's specificity pertains not to work alone but to the forms 
taken by its results: commodities, value, money. We draw on Open Marxist scholarship 
to explore how the state itself constitutes one of these historically specific capitalist social 
forms, and the implications this holds for how we understand radical policy proposals 
(Clarke, 1991; Bonefeld, 1993; Holloway 1995, 1996). The relationship between these 
forms of mediation and social reproduction differs from how Marx has traditionally been 
conceived: 
The distinctiveness of Marx’s theory lay not so much in the idea of labour as the 
source of value and surplus value as in the idea of money as the most abstract 
form of capitalist property and so as the supreme social power through which social 
reproduction is subordinated to the power of capital. (Clarke, 1988, pp. 13-14) 
Combined, these approaches to the relationship between social reproduction, social 
forms and social relations suggest that the escape from ‘work’ need not open the path to 
postcapitalism, and indeed may even prevent it. Either way, the attainment of both post-
work society and post-capitalist society is not nearly so easy as those who propose each 
would have us believe. For instance, that we must work presupposes relations of 
distribution that relate less to labor than life itself: it is capitalist work.  
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Our contention is that the relations of social reproduction do not fade away with 
the diminution of 'paid work' via automation and the supplement of a UBI. With the 
abovementoned understanding of value, not only those ‘working’ and ‘producing’ but 
capitalist society itself is subsumed under the money-form.  
Re-evaluating what we understand by 'work' and its commodification and monetarization, 
we might therefore also say that the association between a post-work array of transitional 
demands and the attainment of a postcapitalist society is not nearly so strong as popular 
accounts suggest. 
The theoretical perspective advanced here thus illuminates how the transitional 
vista of automated worklessness supported by a UBI rests on a continuation of the money 
wage in all but name and the presence of a strong state that becomes the wage-payer of 
both first and last resort, with attendant consequences on the capacity of people or 
workers to resist and contest the conditions or pay to which they are subject. This 
foreshortening of the capacity of workers to struggle in turn foreshortens the capacity of 
the range of transitional measures post-work thinkers cite to lead us into a postcapitalist 
future. By falsely cleansing the world of the contradictions of capitalist society, the 
dynamism of these contradictions is neutered. We will use the current uptake of the UBI 
among authoritarian populists as an example of where this negative potential might travel 
politically, with specific reference to the possible adoption of the measure by the Modi 
government in India. This example highlights the potential consequence inherent in the 
UBI of quashing class struggles in, against and beyond the state- struggles without the 
presence of which the incentive on the part of employers to automate production and 
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replace workers with robots will be much diminished. As such, the transition promises to 
be the premature Thermidor of the proposed end destination. 
We suggest the politics of social reproduction as an alternative prospectus for 
radical change within and beyond capitalist society. This engages with the present 
struggles for alternative forms of social reproduction. We take one specific example of 
this- the Unemployed Workers Organizations established in post-crisis Argentina- as a 
model for how the relationship with work, subsistence and money can be reconstituted in 
such a way as to work through the contradictions of labor, money, state and social 
reproduction without wishing them away. We explore the potential uptake of similar 
models in the UK context. 
We conclude by suggesting that the potential solution to the impasses of the post-
work prospectus is to work within contradictions and expand them. Most notably this 
relates to class struggle recoded not only as struggles within workplaces, but without in 
the sphere of social reproduction. An understanding of social reproduction as the central 
terrain on which capitalism establishes itself shifts our focus to how class actors resist 
within it. This alternative prospectus has a major contribution to make to ongoing attempts 
to fashion critical and radical responses to the crisis of work and the wage. From this 
perspective, technology and automation cannot be reified as neutral forces the unfolding 
of which will deliver us a workless world supported by the intervention of the capitalist 
state as the new wage payer. Rather, even on the terms of the postcapitalist prospectus 
itself, and in the absence of convincing evidence that automation will lead to technological 
unemployment on the scale anticipated, class struggles would be necessary to 
accomplish the kind of economy-wide automation of production on which their vistas of 
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the future hinge (Spencer, 2018). But in that literature addressed in this article, post-work 
society is seen as the accomplishment of a kind of ‘end of history’ that closes 
contradictions and liquidates struggles for better alternative and non-capitalist forms of 
social reproduction. For the absence of this factor, their utopia is an abstract one. By 
centering struggle and social reproduction as we do here, the possibility awaits that 
concrete utopias can be delineated and situated within practice and policy. The 
postcapitalist prospectus has stimulated a renewal of bold left programs for governing the 
future, expressed in the recent electoral pitches of socialists in the UK and France. We 
end, therefore, by considering the kind of politics that could translate our alternative 
perspective into such a policy platform today. 
 
The post-work prospectus 
Although it has appeared in different guises (Aronowitz and Cutler, 1998; Aronowitz and 
DiFazio, 2010), the true origins of the contemporary post-work prospectus (PWP) rest in a 
few formerly obscure pages from Marx’s Grundrisse – the 'Fragment on Machines' (1973, 
pp. 704-6, see Trott, 2017). Later surpassed by the development of his value theory to 
address abstract labor rather than simply concrete labor alone, here Marx forecasts a 
future wherein machines come to replace direct human labor in the process of production, 
rendering the law of value obsolete (Pitts, 2018). Despite its insignificant theoretical and 
textual stature, its reception caught fire through promotion by postoperaists like Antonio 
Negri who associated it with changes afoot in contemporary capitalism (Hardt and Negri, 
2001). What is new today is the enthusiasm with which it has been met in the formal 
political sphere in response to technological shifts. Today, its scenario of postcapitalist 
9	
	
worklessness finds itself popularized by the likes of Mason (2015b). Popping up in the 
pages of broadsheet newspapers, its ideas now inform public debate (Beckett, 2017, 
2018). The strategic opportunities opened up by the current phase of capitalist 
restructuring apparently promise the revitalization of progressive left politics. 
The empirical and theoretical contributions to the PWP are rich and varied, but it 
is possible to isolate several shared emphases and central propositions offered by 
Srniceck and Williams and Mason. First, the development of information technology is 
‘accelerating’. Allied with crisis tendencies in the current phase of capital accumulation, 
this terminates in a post-capitalist future. Second, dynamics of automation and new 
cooperative commons potentiate a post-work society of abundance and leisure. 
Third, progressive left politics must surpass limited, reactive and parochial ‘folk politics’, 
reconfiguring itself around a populist-hegemonic post-work agenda demanding reduced 
working hours, full automation and a UBI (Srnicek and Williams, 2015). 
Although Srnicek and Williams avoid the technological determinism sometimes 
associated with such thinking, devoting a chapter to the political program by which their 
stated aims can be achieved, a crude technological determinism underpins many 
accounts of automation and informationalization (Spencer 2017). With the waning of work 
in an age of intelligent machines, we are told, technological unemployment renders the 
wage insufficient to secure workers' subsistence. Their labor-power- the pure potential to 
labor- must be reproduced through other means. This is where the UBI steps in. It is 
important to note here that the UBI is not posed as a silver bullet, but works in tandem 
with foregoing technological trends to accomplish the outcome of a postcapitalist society 
of automated worklessness. It provides a state-sponsored supplement to ensure the 
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reproduction of labor within a capitalism on the wane, so as to open the way to a 
postcapitalist society beyond it. In the scenario Mason projects, the UBI necessary to 
sustain a working population would have to be socialized in the hands of the state (2015a, 
p. 286). This is because, due to the rise of free machines that enable production at zero 
marginal cost and render impossible attempts to impose scarcity on goods, data and 
services, the conditions for capitalist profit are eroded and ‘the tax base in the market 
sector of the economy would be too small to pay for the basic income’. As such, the 
payment of a UBI implies a certain kind of state and a certain kind of relationship to it, not 
to mention the retention of money and the social relations it expresses. In the following, 
we will take apart this complex of ideas and suggest that the PWP obstructs rather than 
opens the way to a postcapitalist society precisely because of the continuing role of the 
state and money as forms of capitalist social relations in proposals for a UBI, and the 
absence of labor struggles they imply. 
 
Problematizing the UBI: Wage and the money-form 
The PWP, by focusing on transitional demands like full automation, a UBI and the 
reduction of the working week, appears to suggest that the problem with capitalism is that 
it makes us dependent upon ‘work’, and the solution is to have less of the latter. This 
takes ‘work’ as the basis of capitalism as an exploitative system. The implementation of 
the UBI appears progressive for it frees us from this exploitation. It makes everyone semi-
autonomous from work. To this point we present two objections.  
First, this is a limited understanding of capitalism that lends too much weight to 
work itself and not enough to what makes work necessary in its determination as wage 
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labor and the specific kinds of results it assumes. Value, commodities and a certain 
historically-specific set of antagonistic social relations based not around the human 
performance of labor, but the reproduction of human life as labor-power and its mediation 
through abstract social forms, are not even mentioned in these proposals. 
Second, such visions are based on a misconstruction of the nature and 
determination of the ‘wage’. The UBI, Mason contends, pays people ‘just to exist’. But this 
is ‘only a transitional measure for the first stage of the postcapitalist project’. The 
'socialization' of the wage through ‘collectively provided services’, or its abolition, follow 
(2015a, pp. 284-6). Payment ‘to exist’, coupled with automation, allows networked, 
autonomous experimentation in place of labor. As such, Mason suggests that the UBI 
would be a transitional step towards the abolition of the wage. But even this may retain 
the separation of people from independent, non-commodified means of living. The social 
conditions undergirding the wage would continue, with or without the wage itself. The 
social conditions for the sale of labor-power would remain, with or without a buyer. This 
is because the wage is not a reward for expended labor but a payment to keep workers 
in the condition that they can and must labor (Critisticuffs, 2015). The wage subordinates 
human life to ‘money as command’ (Cleaver 1996). We acquire what we need only as 
commodities bearing a price. Money is value-in-motion. Marx’s critique of political 
economy destroys Adam Smith’s belief that money ‘is simply an instrument of accounting 
and exchange that has no substantive economic significance’ (Smith cited by Clarke, 
1988, p. 32). Marx revealed that in capitalist societies money is not simply the means of 
exchange or an innocent mediation but the concrete expression of value, the substance 
of which is abstract labour (Dinerstein, 2015, p. 21). As the most abstract form of capitalist 
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property (Clarke, 1992), money is both the means of exchange among ‘equal’ citizens, 
and the proof of the expropriation of labour. Despite its insubstantiality, money dominates 
and expands across the whole social and existential condition (Lilley and Papadopoulos, 
2014). 
Srnicek and Williams, meanwhile, argue that the UBI would overcome the wage 
relation and the stigmatization that accompanies welfare in countries like the UK by 
abolishing means testing in favor of universal, undifferentiated support (2015, p. 120). In 
this, Srnicek and Williams correctly identify some of the same issues around the 
separation from the independent individual and collective means to reproduce the means 
of living that are at the center of our critique. They recognize the antagonistic constitution 
of class society in a certain set of relations centering on social reproduction, and propose 
to ‘loosen the practical grip of the wage relation’ as a way to foreshorten it (Stronge, 2017). 
However, it is an individual response to collective problems (Coyle and Macfarlane, 
2018). The UBI only retains and further individualizes the same individual reproduction of 
labor-power in a different appearance of the wage relation that stops short of its abolition 
by means of the abolition of the money form tout court.  
It may seem counterintuitive to contend that the UBI marks a continuation of the 
wage relation. But the idea that the UBI facilitates an escape from the wage mistakes the 
wage as a payment for the reproduction of the potential to labor for a payment for labor 
performed. The wage- whether in the form of earnings or benefits, accrued as an 
individual or as a household- guarantees that our labor power is reproduced and, in a 
world where humans exist as labor power, the reproduction of life itself. Without the 
abolition of money, which, as mentioned at the outset, is ‘the most abstract form of 
13	
	
capitalist property’ and ‘the supreme social power through which social reproduction is 
subordinated to the power of capital’, the UBI merely secures the reproduction of humans 
on this same basis (Clarke, 1988, pp. 13-14). Whether we work or not is irrelevant in this 
case, because our potential to do so in a world where the means of production are beyond 
our control would be carried over regardless- possibly pending the reintroduction of labor 
at some future point necessitated by war or crisis sparked by the retention of a state and 
economy left largely intact by the absence in the PWP of any intent to significantly 
restructure the ownership of property on which capitalist society rests. Nowhere is the 
question of material ownership posed, only transformation of intellectual property laws 
deemed unfit to capture the capitalist state of play in a data-driven networked society 
(Mason 2015a). 
With the UBI, the state directly superintends the rule of money. So, while UBI may 
apparently free us from (un)employment and the wage relation, it makes us more 
dependent on the command of money and the state. Money and the state are not neutral 
entities to be appropriated at will but economic and political forms of capitalist social 
relations. In other words, they are ‘forms assumed by the basic relation of class conflict 
in capitalist society, the capitalist relation, forms whose separate existence springs, both 
logically and historically, from the nature of that relation’ (Holloway and Picciotto, 1991, 
pp. 121-2).  If we steer away from work and focus on the totality formed by production 
and social reproduction, we can see that the obstinacy of both the presence of the state 
and the distribution of money mean that no ‘postcapitalism’ need attend UBI’s post-work 
idyll, as is proposed in the programmatic statement of transitional demands that 
characterize the abovementioned proposals. Indeed, by bolstering their power, the 
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transitional route to postcapitalism through a post-work society may well foreclose the 
very thing it sets out to achieve. 
 
 
Problematizing the UBI: The state and class struggles 
This brings us to the problematic treatment of the state amongst the abovementioned 
advocates of the PWP. An automated economy requires a capitalist state supporting and 
maintaining our capacity to consume. It is not difficult to see that UBI increases the 
dependence of people on the state for their subsistence. The PWP does not reflect on 
the character of the capitalist state misconceiving it as an arena for power struggles over 
resources.  This is a managerial view of the state that focuses on the distribution of money 
by the state. In our view, such distribution will mean only a different form through which 
wealth is shared for our social reproduction. The PWP misses the capitalist character of 
the state which, as above-mentioned, is the political form assumed by capitalist social 
relations at a specific phase of their development. The suite of policy options the PWP 
proposes purports to free people from the burden of work sponsored by a better 
distribution of financial resources as a means by which ‘post’-capitalism society can be 
accessed. But it continues humanity’s subordination to the social forms of capitalist 
domination, namely money and the state. 
Mason (2015a) claims that the political horizon of postcapitalism implies the 
development of a ‘wiki-state’ that will ‘nurture new economic forms’ such as digital co-
ops, peer-to-peer transactions and so on. The state here, in common with Srnicek and 
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Williams and others, is portrayed as a neutral instrument that can be seized in the name 
of new hegemonies and popular subjects. The perspective advanced in this paper, 
however, argues that the state is a capitalist state rather than a state in a capitalist society. 
As Clarke highlights, this means that 
the apparent neutrality [of the state] is not an essential feature of the state, it is 
rather a feature of the fetishized form in which the rule of capital is effected through 
the state. It is therefore something that should emerge at the end of the analysis 
and not something that should be inscribed in the analysis from the beginning. 
(Clarke, 1991, p. 185)  
In describing the state’s lack of neutrality, Clarke epitomizes an Open Marxist critique of 
the state as something possessing relative autonomy but ultimately capitalist. In other 
words, the state is the political form of the social relation of capital (Hirsch in Bonefeld 
and Holloway 1991). For Holloway and Picciotto (1977), fetishized forms that conceal the 
reality of antagonistic ‘relations of class domination’ constitute ‘an essential part of the 
reproduction of that domination’. The state itself- and the autonomy that accrues to it- is 
therefore itself a fetishization that converts the classed inequality of capitalist society into 
the political form of ‘equality before the state’ (1977, p. 80). In so doing, the capitalist 
state- which for Bonefeld (2010, p. 22), is always ‘fundamentally a liberal state’-  acts not 
to resolve the contradictions of class society but to manage them. As Clarke argues, the 
liberal capitalist state 
can contain the political impact of those contradictions to the extent that is able to 
secure the integration of the accumulation of domestic productive capital into the 
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accumulation of capital on a world scale, and so provide a basis on which to secure 
the political integration of the working class (Clarke 1992b: 136).  
It is this integration under the auspices of formal equality that makes possible the 
mediation of the class antagonism in guises more favourable to workers themselves, even 
while the state simultaneously ‘conceals the reality’ of those relations (Holloway and 
Piccioto 1977). This contradictory but ultimately characteristic state of affairs suggest 
thatthere is no easy way out of capitalism without at once being in, against and beyond 
the state. But the programmatic policy platform of the PWP achieves only the first of these, 
and risks expanding the power of the state in such a way as to narrow the space of excess 
within which struggles in line with the second and third can proceed. 
The unintended consequences inherent in any putative transition from post-work 
society to post-capitalist society that does not consider the capitalist nature of the nation-
state become particularly evident if we consider the state politics of current proposals for 
the UBI. Consensus is forming around UBI from all sides of the political spectrum. Its 
implementation seems increasingly necessary to combat a generalized ‘crisis of social 
reproduction’ sparked by endemic unemployment and the retreat of the welfare state 
(Caffentzis, 2003; Leonard and Fraser, 2016). But the continuity it guarantees against the 
underlying constraints on living and working today appeals as much to those who wish to 
see the system preserved as does it to those seeking to do away with it. It is increasingly 
recognized even by the free-market right that a UBI may be necessary to contain the 
contradictions of a society where work is performed by robots and workers are surplus to 
requirements. From the Financial Times to the foothills of Davos it recommends itself as 
a safety cord for capitalism (Wolf, 2014). Emboldened by the double-edged feasibility 
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granted by mainstream liberal opinion, UBI is now the big demand of a contemporary left 
inspired by postcapitalist vistas moving in an increasingly populist and statist direction. In 
the UK, such vistas have been mainlined into the everyday intellectual life of the Labor 
Party by a blank-canvass leftwards turn under new leader Jeremy Corbyn (see Pitts and 
Dinerstein, 2017). UK Labor Party Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell recently 
announced a UBI working group, headed up by leading advocate Guy Standing 
(Cowburn, 2017). But where else might its purchase travel politically? As the proposal is 
mobilized around politically, what kind of state (or nation state) does the UBI imply?  
Against leftist aims, one possible destination of the UBI is in the policy agendas of 
contemporary authoritarian national-populists. It has already been adopted by the Five 
Star Movement in Italy ‘as a substitute for all existing social safety provisions linked to 
work and unemployment’ whereby ‘[b]eneficiaries must declare immediate availability for 
work, attend training courses, participate in job interviews, and perform activities that are 
useful to the community in their municipality of residence’ (Caruso, 2017).  In the most 
interesting turn yet, it was announced recently that the government of Nerendra Modi in 
India is considering its implementation (Economist, 2017a).  
The Indian UBI proposals follow hot on the heels of the so-called ‘note ban’, or 
‘demonetization’ whereby, on November 8th, the day of Donald Trump’s election, the 
Indian government imposed a sudden and enforced devaluation of all paper money 
(Maiorano, 2016). The auspicious aim of the measure was to root out corruption in the 
cash-driven informal sector (Kumar, 2016). Some see the UBI as a means by which the 
accumulated scrap cash generated by demonetization can be recirculated. A possible 
tool to combat poverty, the proposals for UBI in India differ in scope from those in, say, 
18	
	
France or the UK. But there are still implications for how we understand the UBI in an age 
of authoritarianism ascendant. 
Following a pilot run in India by Guy Standing, the idea was floated in the annual 
economic survey accompanying the government’s budget declaration (Davala et al, 
2015). Although small- no more than the average month’s wage over the whole year- it 
would make a substantial impact, reducing absolute poverty some 20 per cent. It would 
be partly funded by a bonfire of existing welfare payments. The cuts to welfare would 
specifically target stratified systems for subsidized water, food and agricultural resources. 
As the Economist notes (2017b), this runs the risk of ‘telling an illiterate farmer that a 
food-in-kind scheme he has used for decades is being scrapped to finance a program 
that will put him on par with […] a tycoon who lives in a 27 storey house’. Class 
antagonism is here elided for the abstract ‘people’. 
The UBI measure contains a potential overlap with Modi’s undeclared state of 
emergency, pro-Hindu migrant policy and vows to disenfranchise Muslims (Sharma, 
2016; Das, 2016). For the sums to add up, only 75 per cent of the country could receive 
the payment. Payment via compulsory biometric identification cards would strengthen the 
government’s hand in deciding who does and who does not get paid. Of course, this 
would contradict any claim that this basic income is in any way ‘universal’, but our 
contention here is that this purported universality conceals within it the possibility of its 
own negation in projects of exclusivist national populism. A potential exclusionary effect 
thus teams with the capacity of the government to wield the wand of who gets what. And 
this, perhaps not coincidentally, relates to an outcome of the recent ‘note ban’ 
implemented by Modi around the same time as considerations began of the UBI 
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(Chakraborty, 2017). The note ban was an exclusionary measure not so much targeted 
at but specifically impacting upon Dalits, Muslims and other ethnic groups subject to high 
levels of poverty and joblessness, who tend to subsist more closely from the cash-led 
economy. Demonetization impacted forcefully upon poor farmers who relied on savings 
to subsist, by rendering those savings both useless and worthless. In this way, it replaced 
an individualized currency with a digital state-directed money ripe for adaptation in the 
UBI, in the process encouraging the spending of saved cash as a means to raise effective 
demand.  
UBI mobilizes, on the guarantee of imminent riches, the masses as a national 
citizenry whilst allowing the eventual exclusion of those who fall foul of birth between other 
borders or beliefs. Its power consisting in the totalitarian relationship it establishes 
between the state and the capacity to subsist, the UBI, paid on basis of membership of a 
nationally-defined people, is a policy that aims to cohere such a people in a class society 
where one cannot in practice exist, and excludes those who cannot or will not conform. 
UBI therefore has the potential to be not revolutionary, as the left imagine, but deeply 
reactionary. With the best of intentions in a world gone bad, leftish conceptualizations of 
the UBI sometimes give succor to its possible implementation in the arsenal of 
authoritarianism, comingling with the right in a wider turn to populism, nationalism and 
‘sovereignism’ (Henri-Levy, 2016).  
According to Laclau (2002), populism is about articulating difference on lines of 
equivalence, on the basis of a grievance shared by many. On an irretrievably national 
basis at a time of the breakdown of liberal international institutions, UBI cannot but 
construct this equivalence and the grievances on which it feeds along national lines. This 
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is as much out of necessity as choice, unless the UBI is organized worldwide, or Europe-
wide, for instance- unlikely within a fragmenting global order. Yet the idea cannot be 
extricated from its context in concrete national conditions. In a time of national 
retrenchment, the UBI cannot but imply an exclusionary approach, its ‘universality’ 
recoded as the universality of a national people. Such arguments for a historically 
premature universality mask, as Bonefeld suggests  
the global character of exploitative relations…The specific character of the state's 
integration requires an analysis of the peculiarities of a particular state and its 
national economy so as to understand the interrelation of the international 
movements of capital and the national formulation of policies. (Bonefeld, 1993, p. 
61)  
The UBI sums this up: contrary to its universality, an exclusionary measure which grants 
citizens a guaranteed income but not necessarily those who are not subjects of a given 
state. In this way, the UBI resonates with a politics reconstituting itself around open and 
closed as much as left and right, as the latter undergo a populist convergence. Rolled out 
worldwide, this protectionism could well aid and abet the development of the UBI. The 
prospect of the widespread return of capital controls would help furnish the resources to 
enact national UBIs (Warner, 2016). Where control do not take hold, such as in the EU, 
so-called ‘helicopter money’ could provide the hard cash with which to do it (McFarlane, 
2016). This resonance with the political economy of the present makes more pressing 
scrutiny of another impasse of the PWP: the potential liquidation of labor struggles. 
Liquidating labor struggles? 
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Some advocates contend that the UBI, by affording time and freedom to workers to 
choose how they use their time, would create more opportunities for class and labor 
struggles to ensue (Stronge, 2017). But the critical conceptualization of capitalist society 
we offer in this paper sees the state as a central mediating force between labor and 
capital- not as a neutral instrument of power but as an inherent part of capitalist society. 
The question we must ask then is not so much what the UBI would do in terms of labor 
and capital alone, but manner in which it mediates, and potentially replaces, by means of 
the state, this relationship. Insofar as this is the case the polyvalence of the UBI makes it 
very much up-for-grabs politically, winding up one part of a wider politics that the left must 
do its best to resist.  
The left advocates UBI out of the best intentions, but remains within a mode of 
thinking that, by not understanding capitalism, does not understand how it is confronted. 
Most painfully, it has the potential to fulfil the program of right populisms and 
totalitarianisms through time by liquidating class conflict in production. In this way the UBI 
potentiates the self-destruction of the left and of the labor movement (Cruddas and Kibasi, 
2016). Take, for instance, the link between demonetization and UBI in the Indian case. 
The combined effect of demonetization and UBI would, on the one hand, replace an 
individualized money supply through which people access the things they need by means 
of the wage with one granted at state convenience. On the other, for those not currently 
in receipt of a wage, it creates a permanent dependence on the umbilical cord of the state 
irrespective of its character. Although there are specificities to the situation in India that 
change some of these calculations, applied more widely the UBI breaks here with some 
vital preconditions of class struggle, limiting the bases for mobilization. 
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Under the real illusion of legal equivalence circumscribed by the impersonal power 
of the state, buyer and seller of labor power meet in the market as equal parties. The 
class struggle then moves through, and is contained within, the practices and processes 
assumed by these legal real appearances. Class struggle is a struggle over the form of 
these legal as well as economic and political forms that mediate class struggle, which are, 
in turn, modified, or even destroyed, as in the case of Modi in India or Trump in the USA.  
Wage bargaining sees struggles ensue for a higher price of labor power, engaged in by 
associations of its sellers. This is driven by the collective struggle to live and enjoy life. 
Once the provision of money comes not from the wage but from the beneficence of the 
state, this web of relations by which workers win a better balance between their 
subsistence and the work they do collapses. From the impersonal power of liberal legal 
structures, we have the personalized power of state fiat determining who gets what. The 
weighty democratic, administrative and brute-force heft that this arrangement implies will 
no longer be concealed behind contractual niceties, but waged openly and directly. Class 
conflict destroyed, only state power remains. 
This is an extreme example that usefully serves to highlight how, liquidating class 
struggles for a nationally-constituted citizenry, bad utopias reliant on the UBI imply class 
struggle as a closed case whilst largely retaining the current rule of property ownership, 
including, crucially, that of the means of production, for which no postcapitalist or post-
work vista gives a convincing vision for redress. Crucially the UBI retains the current rule 
of property, of power, whereas, ‘if Karl Marx were alive, he’d be shouting about the 
ownership of the means of production’ (Jon Cruddas, quoted in Sodha, 2017). 
23	
	
The UBI, as a key principle of the proposed post-work society, thus breaks in a 
number of respects with some vital preconditions of worker organization. In his analysis 
of the Keynesian state, Holloway argues that the latter constituted a specific ‘mode of 
domination’ for the Keynesian state contained the power of labor via the ‘monetization’ of 
class conflict. Thus, ‘[i]n the face of rigidity and revolt, money was the great lubricant. 
Wage-bargaining became the focus of both managerial change and worker discontent.’ 
The crisis of Keynesianism was, in this sense, ‘a crisis of a form of containment of labor’ 
(Holloway, 1996, pp. 8, 23, 27). The UBI could become, then, another form of domination 
of the power of labor, only that this time, rather than relying on class conflict, aims at 
obliterating it. 
In this way, it harkens back to those forms of populism and authoritarianism that, 
where they have reared their ugly heads, have sought to destroy the working-class 
movement where capitalism could not by promising the resolution of class struggle on a 
higher plane of primordial identity prior to the political working through and out of 
contradictions. Only here, for the contemporary postcapitalist advocates of the UBI, the 
abstraction that quashes class struggle is only implicitly the national people, and explicitly 
free money and free time under the watchful eye of a benevolent state. The national 
aspect is implicit because, in a world where borders are strengthening and not weakening, 
and strongmen rule supreme, what other basis will there be for a UBI than the nation and 
its ‘people’? The UBI may yet conceal capitalist society’s contradictions in the dark cellar 
of autarky. This way, withdrawing from the world and excluding the outsider, utopia may 
be the last thing UBI leads to. It is our contention that these tendencies are always there 
within conceptualizations of the UBI, right and left. 
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The UBI effectively abolishes any means by which workers can struggle for a better 
deal, obliterating class struggle and purporting to resolve its contradictions at the 
imaginary level of a nation state paying free money to a nationally-defined people. In so 
doing, the vista of an abolition of work afforded by the UBI serves up the fruits of struggle 
prematurely, without struggles having taken place. It temporarily defers the contradictions 
of class antagonism without resolution through the antagonism itself. This is ironic even 
on the terms of the postcapitalist argument itself, insofar as class struggle would be 
necessary to drive up wages to the extent that employers would be motivated to worth 
low-paid workers in bad jobs with machines in the first place. Yet none of the popular 
imaginaries of an automated future entertain this notion, outsourcing capitalist 
development to technology as a neutral force as opposed to one imbricated and resulting 
from wider social relations. 
By endowing the relationship between work and technology with a set of 
eschatological and Promethean associations, the post-work hypothesis steals work from 
its antagonistic context in capitalist social relations that both pre-exist and continue to 
underpin the compulsion to labor in the first place, through money. This is nowhere more 
transparent in the appeal to a benevolent state as the effective payer of the wage qua 
UBI. This purports to change the social relations under which we get paid for the better, 
but runs the risk of doing so for the worst precisely because the class struggle contained 
and concealed in the formal legal relationship between the buyer and seller of labor is 
elided. Addressing demands to a state now invested directly in the reproduction of the 
capacity to labor- in however ‘liberated’ a way- is much harder than fighting for their 
recognition in the workplace. Whilst the workplace comes with its own everyday forms of 
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domination, individual employers have no monopoly on the means of violence such as 
the state wields. In this world, placing the power of deciding who will be paid and for what 
in the hands of a state, however benevolent, jumps the gun, pre-empting the overhaul of 
the wider social relations and social forms of capitalist society.  
 
Social reproduction struggles as ‘labor’ struggles 
We propose an alternative to the conceptualization of the PWP as a transitional phase on 
the path to postcapitalism: the politics of social reproduction, and specifically the 
delineation of ‘concrete utopias’ (Dinerstein, 2016). As noted, scholars have suggested 
that capitalism is undergoing a severe and protracted crisis of social reproduction. 
Employment increasingly fails to support subsistence. This is in our view a crisis of the 
capitalist form of social reproduction. While PWP advocates confuse this situation with an 
unfolding end of work, we use the social reproduction standpoint to reframe this and 
engage with the search for alternative forms of social reproduction that is already actively 
taking place at the grassroots, but which the more ‘accelerationist’ strands of 
postcapitalist thinking dismiss as ‘folk politics’ (Srnicek and Williams 2015).  
The PWP, by seeing in the crisis of social reproduction the end of work, misses 
the connection between production and what precedes it, logically and historically. As 
Nancy Fraser writes, while Marx ‘looked behind the sphere of exchange, into the ‘hidden 
abode’ of production, in order to discover capitalism’s secrets’, it is also necessary to 
‘seek production’s conditions of possibility behind that sphere’ (Fraser, 2014, p. 57). 
Namely: why do we have to work, and what keeps us working? The PWP wants to do 
away with work, without posing the question why it exists in the form it does. In asking 
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this, the social reproduction perspective on the crisis of work that we advocate here takes 
inspiration from Marxist-feminist inquiries into the ‘conditions of possibility of labor-
power' and the ‘manner in which labor power is biologically, socially and generationally 
reproduced’ (Ferguson and McNally, 2015).  Marx writes that ‘the worker belongs to 
capital before he has sold himself to the capitalist’ (1976, p. 723). This relationship begins 
‘not with the offer of work, but with the imperative to earn a living’ (Denning, 2010, p. 80). 
This relates to an ongoing process of primitive accumulation whereby workers are 
dispossessed continually of the common means of meeting their needs and new 
enclosures spring up daily (Dalla Costa, 1995). This is reproduced constantly to keep 
workers in a situation whereby they must sell their labor-power to live. More importantly, 
as Dalla Costa contends, ‘human reproduction is built on an unsustainable sacrifice by 
women, as part of a conception and structure of life which is nothing but labor time within 
an intolerable sexual hierarchy’ (1995, p. 13). The social reproduction perspective sees 
these conditions as key to capitalist society. Workplace exploitation, then, is not the 
singular moment of domination (Bhattacharya 2015). The violent denial of the human 
need to subsist here precedes the compulsion to labor. There is no escaping work without 
addressing how to meet the former. The PWP offers no alternative infrastructure to do so 
independent of commodification. The UBI, a possible solution, only reinforces the rule of 
money with which the wage is intimately connected, simply substituting the buyer of labor 
power with the state.  
What the social reproduction approach suggests, by foregrounding the constitutive 
social relations that undergird work to begin with, is that struggles for social reproduction 
are instances of class struggle. Struggles addressed to state solutions and state 
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recognition are themselves struggles for the means to live and subsist. As Anna Curcio 
points out in an interview with Kathi Weeks (Weeks and Curcio 2015), the same struggles 
‘brought together by the same possibility of survival’, are also struggles for the ‘survival 
and the autonomous reproduction of the human being and a struggle for the survival and 
the reproduction of capital’ (Weeks and Curcio 2015). In fights to protect the welfare 
system, for instance, this dual identity is clear. Our survival hinges on the survival- and 
the prosperity- of capital, for now at least. This creates tensions, struggles, conflicts. They 
center on consumption, the commons, commodification: outside production, in the sphere 
of realization. The survival of society hinges on the ability of people to subsist and 
reproduce the means of both living and laboring.  
Covering everything that reproduces both life and capitalist society, these 
struggles highlight how social reproduction is inevitably crisscrossed by contradictions, 
wherein lies room for resistance and rupture, and for the creation of alternative forms of 
social reproduction, or concrete utopias (Dinerstein, 2016).  Contradictorily, the 
reproduction of each- life and capital- is the reproduction of the other. Capitalist society 
depends upon the commodification of the labor-power we sell in order to live.  Social 
reproduction is a sphere of conflict as long as labor power implies this twin intent. The 
capitalist desires its reproduction to exploit, the worker its reproduction to eat. Wage 
demands, strikes for pay or better hours, exercise regimes, diets. In seeking a better 
standard of life, all express this antagonistic settlement's contradictory contours. 
Any analysis of work and economic life must tune in to these contradictions and 
their possibilities. When we reproduce labor-power, we also reproduce life itself. The 
wage pays for labor-power, and it is through the wage that we live. There is no other 
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way. As such, the ‘contradiction between the needs of the workers and the needs of 
capital that lives at the core of the problem of social reproduction cannot be more vivid. 
This is not a political, economic or social issue but it is about the reproduction of human 
‘life’’ (Dinerstein, 2002, p. 14). In fighting for the welfare system, we both ensure our 
reproduction as humans well as workers, and in turn the reproduction of capitalist society. 
The two sides, in their contradictory unity, are the same. Our survival hinges on the 
survival of capital, for now, from which we seek strength to fight on for an alternative to 
it. The social reproduction standpoint suggests that capital and state sustain us. But it 
endows the situation with a thoroughly contradictory status. There is a total absence of 
any Durkheimian functionalism. The post-work thesis, on the other hand, posits precisely 
such a functional vision of society. Namely, it eliminates conflict and contradiction and 
seeks to ‘solve the problem of work’. At its reactionary extension, UBI seeks the cleansing 
of contradictions in state projects of national-popular renewal. 
To intervene in the politics of work, whilst keeping these contradictions open, one 
must first intervene in the politics of the social relations that support it. Struggles over 
social reproduction are ‘labor’ struggles. Concurrently, ‘labor’ struggles are mainly 
struggles over social reproduction. We struggle to live, not to work. Works mediates life. 
Or better, the wage does. The struggle for money takes place in, against and beyond 
capital.  The social reproduction approach has touched on an important element of 
present class struggles: But this struggle is not only one for ‘crude and material things 
without which no refined and spiritual things could exist’ (Benjamin, 1999). in struggling 
to avail ourselves of what we need to eat, to drink, to share together, we gesture from this 
world to others. That is, we produce surplus of possibilities that, as we have shown, post-
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work advocates are presently missing, and social reproduction scholars have only timidly 
addressed. Within the contradictions set out in this section, it is therefore a political choice 
to identify which kind of society we want to emerge from this crisis of the capitalist form 
of social reproduction. And, at present, all the visions for how this pans out liquidate falsely 
resolve these contradictions in the UBI, depriving them of their transformative dynamism. 
In the next section, we suggest an alternative that liquidates neither social reproduction 
as class struggle, nor class struggle as social reproduction. This centers on a ‘concrete 
utopia’ that keeps open the capacity of the subjects involved to struggle and contest the 
institutionalized forms their social relations assume.  
 
From abstract to concrete utopia: Illustrating an alternative 
Today we witness a generalized embrace of abstract utopias like the automated 
worklessness of advanced robotics and the UBI. But the space to create concrete utopias 
is required (Dinerstein, 2016). Eric Olin Wright (2010) offers a similar term, real utopia, to 
describe how social movements envision new worlds and can transform capitalism. He 
suggests that the expression ‘real utopia’ ‘is meant to be a provocation, for “utopia” and 
“real” do not comfortably go together’. Wright’s ‘real’ utopias are not only desirable but, 
according to the author, they are necessarily viable and achievable. Wright (2013, pp. 3, 
8) claims that ‘if you worry about desirability and ignore viability or achievability, then you 
are just a plain utopian. Exploration of real utopias requires understanding of these other 
two dimensions’.  
The notion of ‘concrete utopia’ is radically different and, we think, more appropriate 
to capture present struggle around social reproduction. Concrete utopia is not concerned 
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with ‘feasibility’ but with opening the possibility to enact a collective dream. Real utopia 
requires ‘objective’ conditions for its realization. The notion of ‘concrete utopia’ refers the 
concrete anticipation of what Ernst Bloch names the not-yet-conscious and, more 
generally, the not-yet (Bloch 1959/1986; see also Bloch and Lowy, 1976; Lowy, 2015). 
The not yet is not probable according to objective indicators but possible, and, as 
Stengers suggests, ‘possibility cannot be calculated a priori because it implies the fact 
that the very description of the system itself can change. And you cannot calculate that’ 
(Stengers and Zournazi, 2002, p. 246). 
A necessary first step to the delineation of such concrete utopias in the present is 
to address class, property and social reproduction whilst still allowing struggle to thrive, 
harnessing the legal and political weaponry at hand to expand space for alternatives 
through and not in spite of the present state of things. It is imperative to locate where this 
potential lies. As an example we will look at one of the sectors of the Argentinian 
Unemployed Workers Organizations (UWOs) as an illustration of how each of the 
impasses outlined above can be overcome and concrete utopias envisioned (Dinerstein, 
2010, 2017; see also Atzeni and Ghigliani, 2007).  
This example is important for two reasons: the first one is that their concern with 
the productive sphere is overcome with reference to new forms of social reproduction 
(Mason-Deese, 2016). The direct dependence on the benevolence of the state is 
mediated through new collective institutions, and the concept of continuing class struggle 
and societal contradiction is kept intact. The second is that the collective actions of the 
UWOs are in no way ‘folk politics’, that is, according to Srnicek and Williams (p. 13), a 
tendency and political action designed to interpret the world and to react against the 
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‘historical experiences of communism’. This Eurocentric and colonial classification of 
grassroots struggles around social reproduction falls short in understanding that the 
struggle for life is now central for social movements. It also ignores that the possibility of 
creating an excess beyond the present lays within these organizing processes. These 
possibilities for an excess, as we shall see, are not exhausted as in the abstract utopia of 
state control, but becomes a structuring principle of concrete utopias that remedy many 
of the flaws of the PWP. While they are always at risk of being integrated into the modus 
operandi and dynamics imposed by the powers that they confront, and therefore suffer 
de-radicalization, the ‘translation’ of these concrete utopias into state policy is a process 
of struggle that allows room for, rather than forecloses, radical changes (Dinerstein, 2015; 
2017) 
Originating in the late 1990s, the Argentinean Unemployed Workers Organisations 
are well-known in  Latin America and elsewherefor their struggle for autonomy and dignity 
against social exclusion and unemployment originating in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Unemployment in Argentina had risen from 6% in 1991 to 18% in 1995. Organizationally 
spontaneous roadblock protests called for ‘job creation, public workers, essential services 
[and] participation in the management of employment programmes’ (Dinerstein, 2010, p. 
358). The ‘Piqueteros’ had a strategy of ‘leveraging state resources through a 
combination of protest and social projects in the community and not only challenged the 
common view of the unemployed as excluded and redundant but also influenced the 
institutional framework within which social demands could be made’. They did so through 
the creation of new UWOs which, through resistance and struggle, were successful in 
drawing down state benefits that would have been paid individually and paid them 
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collectively for community projects that were decided collectively to address the needs of 
social reproduction.  
One in particular is worthy of specific scrutiny: the Union Trabajadores 
Desocupados (UTD), or Unemployed Workers Union, a group of autonomous Piqueteros. 
The UTD was formed following the privatization of the local state oil company- only 5600 
of 51000 workers remained. In the municipality of General Mosconi, 34.6% of the 
population was unemployed by 2001. The UTD was led by ex-oil workers, who assessed 
projects for support according to ‘local need’, ‘dignity’ and ‘genuine work’ in ‘solidarity’. 
Projects addressed ‘long-term sustainability’ in ‘housing, education and environmental 
protection’, and also everyday issues like ‘recycling, refurbishing public buildings and 
houses, community farms, soup kitchen…retirement homes, health care visits to the ill 
and disabled, production of regional crafts, carpentry…maintaining and repairing hospital 
emergency rooms and schools.’ In this way, the UTD became the ‘quasi-city council’ of 
General Mosconi (Dinerstein, 2010, p. 361). 
They did this through state funding, but not in a direct way reliant on the 
benevolence of the state. Rather resources were captured in an active and open 
relationship of conflict and negotiation that created space for things to exceed the capacity 
of the state to control and govern how the money was spent. The UWOs fought for ‘the 
re-appropriation of social programmes for collective purposes’, and they did this by 
switching between two modes of activity: mobilization, which used the roadblocks to 
demand resources; and policy, which moved state resources through the neighborhood 
to implement the resources in social projects. It is only by means of and through the 
seeming contradiction between these two registers of mobilization and social policy that 
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state resources can be leveraged at all. The UWOs worked within contradiction rather 
than seeking to escape in a final, closed settlement that established an abstract utopia. 
Their concrete utopia, insofar as it was achieved at all, was subject to and thrived from 
these contradictions, ‘using resistance as a conduit for community development and 
community development as a conduit for resistance’ (Dinerstein, 2010, p. 361). Any PWP 
based on the UBI, by seeking the absolution from work by means of the state, forecloses 
contradiction in an abstract utopia of automated worklessness with no room for further 
struggle within the interstices of those contradictions. 
Rather than a welfare policy granted from up on high to which individual recipients 
must address themselves, the UWOs instituted ‘welfare policy from below’ (Dinerstein, 
2010, p. 361). Benefits of £30 per head per month were paid every 6 months from the 
state, and then distributed by the UTD among the ‘unemployed workers’ who were ‘willing 
to undertake community work’. By 2005 the UTD managed as many programs as the 
municipality and more than the provincial governments- housing co-ops, garment factory, 
training centers, a university. It also served as a job agency and trade union, using its 
leverage to get unemployed workers jobs, backed up by ‘access blockades’ outside and, 
once enough UTDs employed, ‘line stoppages’ within (Dinerstein, 2010, pp. 360-1). 
As such welfare was locked into a convincing reconstitution of a community of work 
and workers. UTD, for example, identified ‘work as a true human attribute that must be 
used for the production of useful goods and services’ (Dinerstein, 2010, p. 361).  The key 
issue here was ‘dignity’. Their search for dignified work permitted neither Prometheanism 
nor neurosis around what is conceptualized correctly as an everyday point of meaning 
and antagonism. By working within the contradictions that confront the everyday practice 
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of work and the abstract determination of labor in capitalist society, the UWOs ‘challenged 
the individualistic logic of workfare and state policy and reconceptualized ‘work’ in 
capitalist society’ (Dinerstein, 2017). They did so in far more concrete and practical a way 
than the PWP seems capable of, whilst also embedding this in an attempt to overhaul the 
socially reproductive social relations of subsistence that compel us to work in the first 
place. For Zechner and Hansen (2015), ‘struggles around social reproduction allow for 
a renegotiation of the around what is considered work, or what is valued as such’. We 
can see in the Piqueteros’ struggle over social reproduction a similar renegotiation, 
situating the separation from the means of subsistence and the compulsion to sell one’s 
labor power in historical context. Theoretically, this destabilizes it. Practically, it allows the 
concrete search for contemporary on-the-ground alternatives. 
The UWOs are suggestive of the possibilities of ‘translating’ radical political and 
social practice into institutionalized solutions struck with the state. Translation is defined 
as ‘the processes, mechanisms and dynamics through which the state incorporates the 
cooperation and solidarity ethos of the SSE practiced by social movements through 
policy’ (Dinerstein, 2017). However, with this the risk is run of the ‘depoliticization’ of these 
movements by the new legal structures put in place to superintend the state programs on 
which their claims are made. UWOs had to become NGOs, registered and assessed by 
the state, or else, as did the UTD, retain autonomy by using the registration of a friendly 
NGO, so as to ‘access funding [whilst] continuing to design its own strategies and 
implement its own community ventures’ (Dinerstein, 2010, p. 360). But it was working 
within this antagonistic and contradictory relationship with the state that allowed their 
social gains to be achieved. The UBI, on the other hand, concentrates power absolutely 
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in the hands of the state as a benefactor rather than a boss, with the more subservient 
and compliant relationship this implies. The UWOs permit acceptance that the 
embeddedness of social actors ‘in, against and beyond’ the state will always be 
contested. It is this from which we proceed as a starting point, rather than approaching it 
as a limit, so that ‘institutionalization’ is always already ‘contested’ all the way up and 
down. Social movements, in posing alternatives, ‘navigate the tension between resistance 
and integration’ (Dinerstein, 2010, pp. 357-8). And it is this tension that is productive:  
embedding autonomy appears to be achievable by recreating social relations at 
community level, and by engaging with the institutions of society…Autonomous 
collective action by civil society actors remains alive through the steady, continuing 
and often painful struggles underpinned by the tension between affirmation of 
autonomy and recuperation of autonomy by the state. (Dinerstein, 2010, p. 364)  
The Piqueteros wielded power by managing and using this tension, rather than avoiding 
it. This is because there was an excess facilitated that such totalizing solutions as the UBI 
and total automation, by implying the presence of a strong and all-powerful state, do not. 
We can identify four dimensions or ‘zones’ in the movement’s struggle, not staggered but 
contained dialectically within one another. the creative zone, the conflict zone, the 
translation zone and the beyond zone (Dinerstein, 2017). Regardless of compromises 
lost in translation, in the last of these lies an untranslatable excess- ‘the impossibility to 
completely translate movement-led SSE practice into policy’. The possibility of a 
postcapitalist transition consists in the protection and expansion of this space of excess, 
absent in the PWP. 
36	
	
The UWOs demonstrate a collective alternative against the individualized structure 
of the UBI. Indeed, ‘[t]he collective use of individual social/unemployment benefits for 
community development purposes, financed by state programs, but devised, 
implemented and supervised by NGOs, as in the UWO’s case, might not be unimaginable 
in the UK environment’ (Dinerstein, 2010, pp. 364-5). As an alternative using a social 
reproduction approach to recode the issues the PWP currently confronts in the public 
consciousness, this path may well be one policymakers should consider taking that 
moves within contradictions and struggles rather than shutting them down in the search 
for abstract utopias, which reaffirm the violence of abstraction and the power of money 
over humanity.  
This model confers further advantages over the UBI. The PWP bases its vision for 
the future on further technological advancement at a time where the earth’s resources 
have already been plundered to such an extent that the only realistic option is to 
repurpose what we already have at our disposal. This has led some advocates to propose 
the plundering of resources from other planets instead (Bastani, 2017). But the vision of 
a smaller-scale, potentially more folk-political and decentralized alternative rests on a 
form of concrete activity more in keeping with environmental policies and even the 
‘degrowth’ agenda of some green movements.  
To pre-empt a possible objection, it is transparent that UWOs also imply a 
relationship with the state as it currently exists, dependent on its support and funding 
even where this is devolved to the most autonomous level. But they produce an excess 
insofar as they facilitate space for the continued development of conflict and negotiation 
both ‘in’ and ‘against’ the state. The UBI, meanwhile, suppresses class struggles and 
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implies a state that to serve its purpose must be all-powerful and, possibly, all-knowing, 
and against which the recipient of the UBI stands as an individual rather than, as in the 
UWOs, a member of a collective that can organize and bargain for better beyond the 
electoral cycle. Of course, there is the potential that under the UWO system the state can 
act to stifle class struggles. But the antagonistic reflex to resist against such impositions 
is retained, whereas the UBI sublets it under the sign of a universalized national people. 
By producing a totalizing response to the problems of a totalizing system, even where it 
is posed as a transitional demand the UBI threatens an end to struggle and the finality 
whereby institutionalization loses the contested character that it has by default under the 
current configuration of capitalist social relations. 
It is fair to say that the character of the state and its relationship with society is 
somewhat different in, say, the UK, when compared to Argentina. However, some of the 
same principles as found in the UWOs already appear in the Business and Employment 
Cooperatives that have seen some uptake in continental European countries like France 
and Belgium and attracted the attention of the UK government via recent policy initiatives 
like the Taylor Review (Conaty et al, 2015; Taylor, 2017). This suggests that it may be 
possible to harbor alternatives in concrete existing struggles sooner than the speculative 
programs of the post-work prospectus might consider the case. 
Conclusion 
We began by noting that for the PWP, the implementation of the UBI and automaton 
would not mark the achievement of a final state of utopia, but would rather ease the 
compulsion to work under the present relations of production and user into being another 
set of relations more in line with developments in the forces of production- automation, 
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Artificial Intelligence, machine learning- as they push against the current configuration. 
UBI is a means to aid the forces inherent in the former unlock the new set of social 
relations with which the present moment is pregnant. As such, it is not possible to simply 
critique UBI or automation as themselves straightforwardly utopian demands. But it is 
possible to critique UBI on the basis that it is conceived as a necessary transitional step 
what is in effect an entirely abstract postcapitalist utopia. Our perspective here is that the 
inclusion of UBI in the set of shared demands specific to the post-work moment actually 
implies a series of obstructions to the possibility of a concrete utopia along the same lines. 
The critique advanced here suggests that UBI, combined with the automation afforded by 
the development of the forces of production, marks the continuation of the present 
configuration of social relations and not their abolition. Indeed, the implementation of 
state-directed automation and UBI may serve to block the latter. 
Based on the reading of social reproduction and labor struggles given in this paper, 
there is one element of the post-work prospectus that stands up to greater scrutiny and 
resists sublimation under an abstract utopia of state-driven automated worklessness. This 
is the demand for a reduction in the working week, which heterodox advocates of similar 
platforms share (Bregman, 2017; Weeks, 2011). This demand, we feel, resonates with its 
rich history in workers’ movements and labor politics by retaining the space within which 
class struggles can move and themselves create concrete utopias without over-
determination by abstract utopian programs for state-populist hegemony. Indeed, the 
parts of the post-work prospectus on which our critique here focuses- UBI and 
automation- ‘are not nearly as historically-aligned with workers’ struggles and can 
potentially sound like technocratic fixes’ (Stronge, 2017). We would therefore recommend 
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that, if the platform is to continue its persuasive push to the center of public debate, it is 
to such a reduction in working hours that proponents might best direct their efforts, as it 
works from and expands the demands and desires inherent in existent struggles, and 
opens out rather than squeezes the space in which yet new struggles can arise. This can 
proceed independently of the more problematic proposals of full automation and the 
payment of a UBI. 
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